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Various system architectures have been proposed for high 
assurance enforcement of multilevel security.  This paper provides 
an analysis of the relative merits of three architectural types – one 
based on a security kernel, another based on a traditional 
separation kernel, and a third based on a least-privilege separation 
kernel. We introduce the Least Privilege architecture, which 
incorporates security features from the recent “Separation Kernel 
Protection Profile,” and show how it can provide several unique 
aspects of security and assurance, although each architecture has 
advantages. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4 [Software]: Operating Systems – security and protection. D.2 
[Software Engineering]: Software Architectures – Data 
abstraction; Domain-specific architectures.  
General Terms 
Measurement, Performance, Design, Security, Verification. 
Keywords 
Principle of Least Privilege, Security Kernel, Separation Kernel 
Partitioning Kernel, Multilevel Security, Architecture. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After years of experimentation with alternate techniques, it is 
apparent that the existence of different levels of data sensitivity in 
automated environments with heterogeneously trusted users still 
calls for multilevel-secure IT systems [32][33]. Various system 
architectures have been proposed for high assurance enforcement 
of multilevel security.  Many of these systems utilize common 
kernel constructs such as the security kernel [3] and the 
separation kernel.[36] However, we lack metrics or even a 
common framework for understanding the relative security 
characteristics of the different approaches.  The purpose of this 
paper is to (1) compare and contrast several idealized MLS system 
architectures that are based on these kernels and (2) provide a 
basis for the construction of architectural security metrics.   
We examine the classic “Evaluated Policy” (EP) architecture 
(e.g., XTS-400 [12], and GEMSOS[39]) based on a security 
kernel, the “Multiple Independent Levels of Security” (MILS) 
architecture [1][27][48] that is based on a basic separation kernel, 
and a new architecture [18] based on a kernel that is fully 
compliant with the security features defined in the Separation 
Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP): [34] the Least-Privilege (LP) 
architecture. 
Comparing apples and oranges, such as these three architectures, 
requires abstraction of common characteristics.  A policy 
equivalence class  is one of those common characteristics. We 
describe a generic MLS environment as including these necessary 
functions, the absence of any of which would undermine the 
realization of the MLS policy:    
 Establishment and isolation of equivalence classes of system 
resources – whereby all of the active resources in a given 
class are to be provided with the same security policy 
privileges  
 Rules for how interaction may occur between equivalence 
classes – for MLS systems, the rules define a partial order of 
flows 
 MLS policy enforcement – mechanisms that ensure the rules 
 A method for ensuring that the enforcement mechanisms 
themselves conform to the rules. 
 A mapping between equivalence classes and MLS human-
readable labels – providing a link to National or other policy 
for handling of sensitive information. 
We describe the enhancement of the basic MLS environment with 
functions for controlled relaxation, restriction, and dynamic 
modification of the MLS policy. These functions are commonly 
required for practical high assurance MLS systems. With 
controlled relaxation, high information can be securely 
transitioned to low domains, when appropriate. Restrictions to the 
strict MLS policy enable the application of the principle of least 
privilege (PoLP), as well as certain specialized sub-policies; 
whereas dynamic policy modification supports adaptive response 
to emergencies and other environmental changes[32][33].   
The three architectures differ in their approaches to these 
functions, and the differences are used to compare the assurance 
that the architectures embody.  Additionally, they are compared 
with respect to several usability factors: scalability, reusability of 
components, and performance.  While each architecture has 
advantages, in summary, our analysis shows that the Least 
Privilege and Evaluated Policy architectures provide better 
assurance. 
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 2. BACKGROUND 
To establish the context for the comparative analysis that follows, 
several underlying security policy concepts are described. 
2.1 Security Policies 
We regard mandatory access control (MAC) policies as those that 
regulate all users’ access to information based on the sensitivity 
level of the information and the authorization (“session”) level of 
the individual user. The policies are mandatory because their 
enforcement is intended to be both global in scope and persistent 
in time, such that individual users cannot override the policy 
during normal use.  Often, this amounts to ensuring that the user 
and his/her surrogate programs are constrained to create or 
interact with information that is at the same sensitivity level as the 
user’s session.     
Historically, The primary security policy of interest has been that 
regarding the handling of sensitive documents with hierarchical 
confidentiality labels such as TOP SECRET (TS), SECRET (S), 
and UNCLASSIFIED (U).  However, MAC policies are also used 
for managing information based on integrity labels, as well as 
non-hierarchical labels such as would identify an area of interest 
which must be kept separate within a hierarchical level, like a 
defense capability program (e.g., TS CRYPTO), or finance 
processing.  Research has shown that MAC policies have a label 
space that forms a lattice with respect to the reads and writes (i.e., 
information flows) that are allowed [9]. 
A secure computer system protects the security mechanisms’ 
internal code and data and hardware resources. Such a system 
provides a translation of organizational security policies [46] by 
way of automated mechanisms that control the system’s 
resources: the automated security policy.  The controlled 
resources include the security mechanisms’ internal code and 
data, as well as the exported resource abstractions of the system 
(e.g., processor time, files, devices, processes).  This description 
assumes that inter-process communication mechanisms (e.g., 
pipes) can be sufficiently modeled, for the purpose of security 
analysis, as objects that are read from and written to.   
Subjects are the active entities of a system (e.g., processes, or 
programs in execution) and may act as surrogates for users (e.g., 
administrators or ordinary users), or may be independent system 
“daemons.”  Note that “exported resources,” as used here, 
subsumes both subjects and objects.   To implement a MAC 
policy, each exported resource is associated, explicitly or 
implicitly, with a sensitivity level. The policy enforcement 
mechanisms then ensure that the only accesses allowed in the 
system are those in which the interactions between levels are 
consistent with the MAC policy. 
Multilevel security (MLS) policies are those MAC policies in 
which subjects may have access to objects in parts of the lattice 
that: (1) can be different than that of their related user session 
level, and (2) are allowed by normal “paper world” information 
handling policies.  In other words, subjects are not constrained to 
interact with objects at their own level.  They may read “down” 
and write “up” with respect to the confidentiality lattice, as well as 
read objects of greater integrity and write to objects of lesser 
integrity.  These operations are consistent with the Bell and 
LaPadula [4] and Biba [7] models.  Note that in this document, 
“read” (as in “subject reads object”) indicates a simple 
observation whereby information flows from the object to the 
subject; whereas “write” indicates modification, whereby 
information flows from the subject to the object.  This semantics 
for write, sometimes called a “blind write,” does not imply read.  
Mechanical problems of implementing “blind writes” are left to 
the system engineers. 
2.2 Trusted Subjects 
Useful MLS systems must include various functions for two-way 
interaction between levels.  These multi-level functions can be 
modeled by trusted subjects that have a label range spanning 
multiple nodes of the lattice.[47][10][20][40] It is a significant 
distinction that trusted subjects do not violate the security policy: 
rather their defined behavior is an explicit part of the security 
policy, as follows.  The set of flows allowed by the system MLS 
security policy is the union of: (a) the flows allowed by the strict 
MLS policy; and (b) the set of flows defined to be allowed for the 
system’s trusted subjects (here, called the relaxed MLS policy).  
As a result, the “incorrect or malicious execution [of a trusted 
subject] is capable of violating the system security policy.”[31]  
Trusted subjects are relied upon to conform to the relaxed MLS 
policies, if not help enforce the strict MLS policy.  For example, 
consider a down-grader or guard, which is a TS  trusted subject 
that can read and write data at both TS and S; specifically, it can 
“write down” from TS to S. This program needs to be carefully 
engineered so that only the intended information is written down, 
and it is written only to the intended objects.   
2.3 The Principle of Least Privilege 
In their 1975 review, Saltzer and Schroeder [38] identified least 
privilege as the restriction that “every program and every user of 
the system should operate using the least set of privileges 
necessary to complete the job.”  Primarily, this principle limits the 
damage that can result from an accident or error.  It also reduces 
the number of potential interactions among privileged programs to 
the minimum for correct operation, so that unintentional, 
unwanted, or improper uses of privilege are less likely to occur.  
As applied to internal mechanisms of a secure system, the 
principle of least privilege also helps to minimize and clarify the 
design. Least privilege mechanisms supported by operating 
systems include access control lists or capabilities relative to 
individual users and objects, and privilege rings (i.e., hardware-
enforced hierarchical privilege domains).   
The principle of least privilege provides a clear foundation for 
understanding why a system should not be configured to allow 
unfettered access to resources, such as results from the use of 
“super-user” or “root” programs in a Unix-like system [45].   To 
arrive at a securely deployed system, it must be capable of 
supporting least privilege, and it must have been administratively 
configured such that the programs that might execute will be 
accorded “the least set of privileges necessary to complete the 
job.”  If a system does not allow individual users and programs to 
be so configured, the accountability mechanisms (e.g., audit) will 
be less able to accurately discern the source of various actions, 
e.g., individual modifications within a file.  Thus, the ability of a 
secure system to realize the goals of accountability, as well as the 
confinement of damage, is limited by the level of granularity with 
which the system is able to invoke the principle of least privilege 
[22].  The ideal from a security perspective is that a system should 
be able to apply least privilege at the same granularity as the 
resources that it exports (e.g., individual files). 
 3. KERNELS 
A system security architecture of enough functionality to be of 
interest has layers of functions, services, and interfaces.  At the 
center of the architectures examined here is a small kernel, which 
is simple and minimized.[49] The kernel manages hardware 
resources, from which it creates, exports and protects abstractions 
(e.g., subjects/processes and memory objects) and related 
operations.  The desired security characteristics of a high 
assurance kernel are those of a reference monitor:[3] always 
invoked, tamperproof, and “small enough to be subjected to 
analysis and tests, the completeness of which can be assured.”   
If the kernel is always invoked, scurrilous processes cannot 
bypass its protection mechanisms to access resources.  If the 
kernel is tamperproof, the protection mechanisms cannot be 
modified to perform falsely when they are invoked. Complete and 
consistent mediation of access results.  In order to be “completely 
analyzable,” a corollary to smallness is that the design must also 
be simple, as well as minimized to contain only the necessary 
functionality [11]. 
3.1 Security Kernel 
A security kernel binds internal sensitivity labels to exported 
resources, and mediates access by subjects to other resources 
according to a partial ordering of the labels defined in an internal 
policy module.[2] The label space may support confidentiality and 
integrity policies as well as non-hierarchical categories,[26] A 
security kernel usually provides a hardware-supported ring 
abstraction [43][44] and can host trusted subjects. [39] The rings 
can separate applications within a process. Thus, a subject is a 
process-ring pair. All high assurance security kernels to date have 
utilized segmented memory, which provides persistent hardware 
based process-local memory-protection attributes [12] [13] [39] 
[41] as opposed to dynamic, global, hardware attributes based on 
memory paging mechanisms. 
The security kernel mediates external communication via network 
devices that are each dedicated to a given sensitivity level, or via 
multilevel devices, in which a sensitivity label is bound to each 
network protocol entity (e.g., datagram).  Security kernels 
generally support full resource and resource-allocation 
configurability during runtime.   
3.2 Separation Kernel 
A separation kernel [36] maps the set of exported resources into 
partitions1: resource_map: resource → partition. 
There may be multiple “subject” resources and multiple “object” 
resources within a given partition, but a partition is not itself a 
subject.  Resources in a given partition are treated equivalently 
with respect to the inter-partition flow policy, and specifically, 
subjects in one partition can be allowed to access resources in 
another partition. 
Separation kernels enforce the separation of partitions, and allow 
(subjects in those) partitions to cause flows, each of which, when 
                                                                  
1 A mathematical Partition of a set, S, divides S into subsets, 
called blocks, such that each element of S belong to exactly one 
block and the blocks do not overlap. Blocks form equivalence 
classes of S with respect to the elemental equivalence relation 
“in the same block as.”[35] In separation kernel and MILS 
literature, blocks are called “partitions,” and we will use that 
terminology here. 
projected to partition space (per the resource_map function), 
comprises a flow between partitions (which may be between 
different or identical partitions).  The allowed inter-partition flows 
can be modeled as a “partition flow matrix” whose entries indicate 
the mode of the flow, partition_flow: partition × 
partition → mode. The mode indicates the direction of the 
flow, so that partition_flow(P1, P2) = W means that 
subjects in P1 are allowed to write to any resource in P2.   
The assignment of resources to partitions and the access control or 
“flow” rules are passed to the separation kernel in the form of 
configuration data that the kernel interprets during system 
initialization.   Since configuration data correctness is critical for 
the enforcement of the intended security policy, a configuration 
tool is often described for the construction of flow rules. Although 
not part of the kernel itself, this tool can help the security 
administrator or system integrator to organize and visualize 
complex data. This helps to ensure that user inputs reflect the 
intended policy.   
Another term for a separation kernel is a partitioning kernel 
(PK)[25], and we will use that in the remainder of this document 
to distinguish the basic separation kernel from the least privilege 
separation kernel, discussed next.   
3.3 Least Privilege Separation Kernel 
Least privilege separation kernels (LPSKs) extend the PK concept 
to support the greater privilege granularity described in the NSA 
Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) [34]. The LPSK also 
generalizes the PK’s reference monitor aspect to be the locus of 
control for all inter-partition flows.  In addition to the 
resource_map and partition_flow functions of a PK, an 
LPSK supports the principle of least privilege in a manner than 
can be represented as a “subject-resource” flow matrix, 
subj_res_flow: subject × resource → mode.  The 
SKPP allows the subject-resource flow matrix to override the 
rules of the partition flow matrix, however we prefer a more 
restrictive interpretation where a given flow is allowed by the 
LPSK only if both matrixes allow it: [34][21] 
allow_flow(subject, resource, mode) →  
mode ∈ subj_res_flow(subject, resource) 
&  
mode ∈ partition_flow(subject.partition,      
  resource.partition)  
While the allowed partition and subject-resource flows can be 
unstructured and arbitrarily complex, the SKPP requires that (1) 
each secure configuration include an identification of a “base” 
partial ordering of flows between partitions to identify the strict 
MLS policy, and (2) subjects allowed to cause flows between 
partitions in addition to those base flows are treated as trusted 
subjects.  Figure 1 shows a system MLS security policy with 
circular flows between the partitions (thick arrows) and between 
the subject and object resources (thin arrows), and illustrates how 
a base partial ordering (the thick, solid arrows) determines which 
of the subjects must be trusted. The subject in Partition 3 must be 
trusted, since its flow to the object in Partition 1, a thin dashed 
arrow, is not consistent with the base flows (the projection of this 
flow in partition space is represented by the thick dashed arrow). 
The SKPP defines various degrees of runtime configuration 
change, as a means for altering the TOE security policy, although 
it does not provide advice or detailed requirements for how a 
 vendor should provide evidence of the “continuity of secure state 
during the course of dynamic configuration changes.”  
4. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES  
In the class of architectures examined here, the Trusted 
Computing Base (TCB) includes a kernel, which is implemented 
using a combination of hardware and software mechanisms, and 
all applications essential for security policy support. We assume 
that such supporting policies, such as authentication and audit, are 
correctly provided and focus on how the MLS policy itself is 
realized.  Thus, the TCB of each MLS architecture comprises a 
kernel that is configured to manage resources in a specific way, 
and in one case, an application program that is essential to 
enforcing the MLS policy.  
In addition to the active mediation of subjects’ access to exported 
resources, realization of an MLS policy may require passive 
design measures, to ensure that information does not flow through 
internal resources in violation of the rules (i.e., covert 
channels[19][28]).  In other words, an enforcement mechanism 
[42] cannot include an effective procedure for completely 
determining its own consistency [14][29] with respect to the 
policy it is enforcing; so passive design techniques or externally 
applied methods are required.  These techniques can include for 
example, physical separation of resources, and design disciplines 
that result in temporal or spatial partitioning of internal resources. 
Due to their use of minimized kernels, all three architectures 
require either a customized operating system or a translation layer 
between their respective kernels and any complex, commercial-
grade applications. System application components outside of the 
TCB may also translate the TCB-exported resources into new 
abstract data types, but the TCB’s policy restrictions will still hold 
over those resources. For example, resource management services 
such as an ORB or DBMS can be provided, but these kernel-
hosted services would not enforce or support multilevel security 
functions, so are not significant to an understanding of the 
architectures’ multilevel security issues.  
All three architectures can support trusted subjects and can be 
configured as a network of similar systems, assuming a common 
sensitivity-label lattice in the network. Architectures built upon 
separation kernels, be they PK or LPSK, will be referred to as 
“PK-based architectures.” In Sections 6, 7, and 8, the three 
architectures are compared with respect to security functionality, 
assurance, evaluatability and usability   
4.1 MILS 
The MILS architecture is based on the PK and the use of trusted 
subjects to manage inter-level communication.  Because MILS 
itself is evolving [1][48][27], we summarize our current 
understanding of it as follows.  
The kernel of the MILS architecture is a real-time PK.  MLS 
sensitivity labels are assigned to each partition by system-level 
applications or system (vice kernel) configuration data. 
Hierarchical confidentiality labels comprise the label space. At 
least one of the partitions is allowed (via PK configuration data) 
to read and write data in all of the other partitions.  Enforcement 
of inter-partition flow policy is allocated to a trusted subject in 
this partition, which is called for example, a Block Access 
Controller (BAC),[27] or Partitioning Communication System 
(PCS).[1][48] This AC-subject,2 provides the only means by 
which other subjects can communicate between local partitions or 
between partitions in distinct network nodes. Thus, subjects read 
and write information in other partitions by making requests to the 
AC-subject. Similar to the PK’s configuration tool, an AC-subject 
configuration tool may be used to generate AC-subject 
configuration data. 
The architecture statically allocates one process per partition 
(dynamic changes are described in Section 6). Hardware support 
for rings is not provided, so there is one subject per process.  
Subject isolation is based on the PK’s partition-separation 
mechanism, and the general paradigm for program services is the 
use of multiple partitions (vs. multiple subjects in a process).  For 
example, a database service could be provided by a dedicated 
process/partition, where database accesses are accomplished via 
inter-partition communication. 
Several partitions may be assigned the same confidentiality label: 
here we refer to these as sub-partitions, since together, they 
comprise an equivalence class with respect to the system MLS 
policy. Least privilege can be provided by restricting sub-
partitions, over and above the MLS constraints, through the AC-
subject. We understand that one MILS vendor may be working on 
incorporation of a kernel least privilege mechanism in their PK, 
but that development has yet to be published. Protection from 
covert channels is supported by the static assignment of resources 
to a given partition.  
4.2 Evaluated Policy 
The Evaluated Policy (EP) architecture is based on a security 
kernel. The name Evaluated Policy architecture derives from the 
fact that the flow policy enforced by the system is validated as 
part of product evaluation.   
There may be several subjects within the same process (as stated 
above) The EP architecture uses each ring to identify a privilege 
domain, across all processes. This is done by segregating 
programs that have different privileges (e.g., even those with the 
same labels or within the same process) into different rings – 
creating a privilege-based partitioning of resources that is 
orthogonal to the MLS-label based partitioning.  Within a process, 
more privileged subjects can also be given security labels that 
                                                                  
2 We will use this term, since at the time of this writing we could 
not find a common name for the component.  
 
Figure 1.  Partially Ordered Flows and Trusted-subject  
 
 provide more access than the less-privileged subjects (e.g., to 
support an MLS service in the most-privileged ring), so a process 
can span equivalence classes, which is not possible in the PK-
based architectures, where subjects are labeled homogeneously 
within partitions.   Hence the “interference” of a trusted subject 
can be limited to occur only within its privilege domain, as well as 
within its label range. The hardware rings support both an 
effective separation mechanism for protecting the privileged 
programs, and a secure and efficient mechanism for transitioning 
control from one program to the other (e.g., call gates). 
The EP architecture uses CPU scheduling and memory allocation 
schemes that can dynamically interleave security levels, rather 
than allocating those resources statically. 
4.3 Least Privilege  
Least Privilege (LP) architectures [18] inherit characteristics from 
both the MILS and EP architectures, and use an LPSK.  Thus, like 
MILS, an LP system gets its definition of equivalence classes and 
flow policy from its initialization environment, and is run 
statically with those definitions (dynamic changes are described in 
Section 6).  As with the EP architecture, hardware-supported rings 
are used to protect privileged applications and to define subjects 
of a process; and there may be many subjects within a given 
equivalence class.   
Unlike the MILS architecture, the LP architecture does not require 
an AC-subject to perform its basic functions, but can host trusted 
subjects in a multi-level partition, if one is needed for other 
purposes.  The LP architecture utilizes the partition, least 
privilege, and ring mechanisms of LPSK to provide the ability to 
securely manage complex processing environments, protecting 
and confining privileged applications, while limiting covert 
channels through the static allocation of resources.  
5. COMPARISON FACTORS 
The comparison of system security architectures includes 
functionality, assurance, usability and evaluatability factors. As 
discussed in the following sections, several architectural 
properties are inherited from their respective kernels. 
6. FUNCTIONALITY  
A high assurance MLS system enforces the MLS policy and may 
include capabilities for the relaxation, restriction, and dynamic 
modification of that policy. Inherent to the maintenance of a strict 
MLS policy is the establishment and isolation of equivalence 
classes, rules for interaction between those classes, enforcement 
of the rules, design of the enforcement mechanism to conform to 
the rules (see Section 7.2), and a mapping between the 
equivalence classes and human-readable MLS labels.  Incorrect 
realization of any of these can subvert the security policy.   
6.1 Establishment of Equivalence classes 
In all three architectures, the kernel defines equivalence classes 
for MLS policy enforcement by associating attributes with 
exported resources, and it is axiomatic that the equivalence classes 
are provided to the kernel correctly to reflect the organizational 
security policy. For PK-based architectures, the binding of 
partition attributes to resources is imported via configuration data 
during initialization. In EP architectures, the kernel binds 
machine-readable security labels to resources as they are created. 
In all cases, exemptions to isolation are allowed per the policy 
rules. 
6.2 Specification of Security Rules 
The security rules define the MAC policy. For PK-based 
architectures, the rules for interaction across equivalence classes 
are defined in the kernel configuration data.   In MILS systems, 
rules in the AC-subject configuration data restricts the transitivity 
of flows allowed by the PK configuration data.  The rules can be 
configured to result in partially ordered inter-partition flows 
(modulo flows caused by trusted subjects).   
In EP architectures, the kernel security module specifies rules for 
partially ordered interaction across equivalence classes  (modulo 
flows caused by trusted subjects).    
6.3 Locus of Policy Enforcement  
In all three architectures, cross-equivalence-class information 
flows are enforced based on both the rules and the equivalence-
class attributes associated with resources. In the MILS 
architecture, rules are enforced by a combination of the PK and 
the AC-subject.  In the EP and LP architectures, the kernel 
enforces the rules.   
6.4 Mapping to Human Readable Labels 
None of the kernels of the three architectures require human-
readable labels in their implementation: the mapping from human-
readable labels to the corresponding equivalence classes is 
performed outside of the kernel in a manner consistent with 
policy.   
6.5 Relaxation of Policy  
The architectures differ in the ways that relaxation of the strict 
MLS policy is achieved. The relaxed MLS policy behavior of 
trusted subjects has been called “intransitive noninterference,”[37] 
a policy where, for example, a trusted subject may move data 
from TS to S, as an intermediary, but “untrusted” TS and S 
subjects cannot do so directly. We refer to the constrained 
behavior of a trusted subject as controlled interference, to avoid 
the double negative. Traditional difficulties in trusted subject 
development have been in modeling their correct behavior, as well 
as implementing useful constraints to guarantee correct 
behavior.[5]  
The PK-based architecture configuration data determines which 
subjects may interact (both read and write) between security 
levels, and are therefore “trusted.” The EP architecture assigns the 
individual trusted subject a label range (e.g., U to TS), allowing it 
to perform the necessary functions within that range (e.g., 
downgrade).   
6.6 Restrictions to Policy  
There are several “least privilege” mechanisms for constraining 
subjects from unfettered access to resources. EP and LP 
architectures, using kernel ring support, can constrain subjects.  
For example, a TS subject in ring 2 would be able to access only 
TS objects in rings 2 and 3. Although the MILS architecture does 
not utilize hardware ring separation, PoLP can be applied by 
subdividing a given partition into privilege-specific sub-partitions, 
some of which may be allowed less access to resources than the 
partition would allow. In the LP architecture, the LPSK’s 
subj_res_flow function constrains subjects, with kernel 
assurance, to access only specific objects in a partition, thus 
supporting least privilege at the same level of granularity as the 
resources that the kernel exports – a granularity of control not 
possible in a PK or a security kernel.  
 Another restriction to information flow of interest is that of being 
able to control how “far” in the sensitivity-label lattice 
information may directly flow. We refer to this property as 
“intransitive information flow.”  It is different from controlled 
interference in that it is a restriction to the strict MLS policy 
rather than an extension or relaxation. Intransitive information 
flow has several applications; such as to provide integrity control 
in systems without explicit integrity labels, when there is a 
concern that low confidentiality information might corrupt high 
confidentiality subjects. Intransitive information flow can be 
achieved in the PK-based architectures by configuring the 
partition flow matrix to disallow direct reading of U information 
by TS subjects, and direct writing of TS objects by U subjects; but 
allow read-down/write-up from (e.g., an integrity filter program 
in) a SECRET partition.  In the LP architecture, least privilege can 
limit the transitive flow associated within the SECRET partition 
to a single subject; this can also be achieved in the MILS 
architecture by configuring the system to have only one SECRET 
subject. 
The LPSK kernel can also be configured to strictly prohibit 
transitive flow from U to TS.  This can be accomplished in the 
subject-resource flow matrix by ensuring that the resources in S 
(including subjects) that can interact with TS are distinct from 
those in S that can interact with U. A similar separation can be 
created with the EP architecture through the use of non-
hierarchical categories. 
6.7 Dynamic Security Policies  
The need for secure systems to respond to changing conditions 
[32][33] implies the support for dynamic policies, i.e., where 
mandatory access control semantics may be changed or over-
ridden during extraordinary circumstances.  The three 
architectures address dynamic policy changes in different ways.   
The PK-based architectures’ configuration data can include pre-
configured, pre-verified policy “vectors” [34] to enable a runtime 
kernel policy change. It is also possible for a MILS system to 
support dynamic changes to the AC-subject’s code or 
configuration data. For the EP architecture, the system must be 
halted, the internal policy module replaced, and the kernel 
recompiled and then restarted.  
A serious consideration regarding dynamic security policies is 
their lack of formal foundations,  industry standards, and accepted 
National policy.  We know of no formal security policy model for 
dynamic MLS.  It is clear from previous work [16] that ad hoc 
changes to an access control policy can prevent the understanding 
of the ultimate policy.  Of particular concern are the revocation of 
access to data that is no longer accessible under a new policy, and 
how to “get the genie back in the bottle” after an emergency. If a 
given partition or domain has been “polluted” with higher 
confidentiality data, cleaning it up may be intractable, short of 
drastic action.  
7. ASSURANCE  
This section summarizes several architectural factors the affect the 
assurance of secure systems. 
7.1 Persistence of Policy 
The primary conceptual difference between EP kernels and 
separation kernels is in the nature and persistence of their security 
policies.  The policy of a security kernel is to control flows in a 
lattice. In contrast, the policy of a PK is to enforce the policy that 
is input to it: a second order effect.  An EP system’s policy is 
determined at kernel compile time, whereas SK systems enforce 
(or interpret, in compiler terminology) a policy that is determined 
at boot time, through configuration data.  As a consequence, the 
security policy of an EP system is verified when it (including the 
security kernel) is evaluated, but the policy of the PK-based 
system can only be verified after the construction of the 
configuration data and the integration of the data with the system.   
The lack of persistence of a security policy in PK-based 
architectures implies that there is inherently less assurance of its 
enforcement, compared to EP systems. 
7.2 Design to Avoid Covert Channels 
The design of the TCB to avoid covert channels, and the analysis 
to demonstrate their absence, is essential for all MLS systems. 
These activities are more difficult with EP architectures (than with 
PK-based architectures) due to their use of dynamic runtime 
resource allocation.   
The LP architecture is less problematic for covert channels than 
the MILS architecture, since in the latter the analysis must extend 
to the AC-subject.  
7.3 Structural Abstractions 
The architectures differ in the abstractions available to support 
development. The “second-order” policy of PK-based 
architectures is not as concrete as the EP architecture’s MLS 
model. Also, the MILS architecture lacks an overarching 
abstraction like rings for organizing program integrity and 
privilege[43]: those considerations must be handled in an ad hoc 
fashion via restrictions defined in AC-subject configuration data. 
As a result, it is more likely that the intended MLS policy can be 
undermined in a MILS- or LP-based system through programmer 
and verifier confusion (e.g., in constructing either the AC-subject 
or the configuration tool). 
7.4 Reliance on Trusted Subjects  
Reliance on trusted subjects is an architectural weakness for 
several reasons, including the problem that they require analysis 
and demonstration of functional correctness over and above what 
is required for the basic MLS security model. A principle for the 
use of trusted subjects is to minimize their range of trust.[30][6] 
Unfortunately, the AC-subject requires a range over all partitions, 
so it is a single point of failure.  That the fundamental MLS policy 
functions of MLS enforcement and mediation of relaxed MLS 
policy are performed in a trusted subject complicates this 
situation.  However, it is clear that the addition of kernel-enforced 
constraints to trusted subject behavior reduces the amount of 
“blind faith” (viz., trust) that the users must have in them, and 
commensurately increases the assurance in the system compared 
to one without such constraints.  The increased granularity with 
which the LP architecture can apply constraints on trusted 
subjects provides is an assurance advantage in this regard. 
7.5 Verification of Configuration Data  
Verification of configuration data in PK-based architectures is a 
significant concern, as this data determines the system’s security 
policy. The verification will likely be supported by the presence 
of evaluated configuration tools.. The need for validation of each 
change to configuration data may result in lesser assurance than 
that provided by the evaluation of EP architecture systems, whose 
rules are verified once during the evaluation of each security 
kernel.   
 We do not yet have standards or accepted practices regarding PK 
policy and AC-subject configuration tools, such as for the 
properties they are supposed enforce and the criteria[8] for their 
robust construction.  Until these standards and practices are 
established, the tools themselves can be a source for weakening 
the assurance of PK-based architectures.   
8. EVALUATABILITY AND USABILITY  
To ensure system trustworthiness, all of the mechanisms 
providing the basic security functions in a high assurance system 
need to be carefully assessed (i.e., evaluated).Security evaluation 
is an expensive, time-consuming effort that requires highly skilled 
personnel, so architectural factors that ease or get in the way of 
evaluation of a system are of interest.  Also, performance, 
scalability and re-usability can help to determine the suitability of 
a security architecture for a particular use and are briefly 
summarized here.  
8.1 TCB Code and Data 
The assessment effort of a TCB module is roughly the same 
whether it is in the kernel or in a trusted subject.  So for a given 
architecture, you “pay now” with kernel analysis or “pay later” 
with AC-subject analysis. Additionally, the evaluation of the 
configuration data for PK-based kernels, and AC-subjects for 
MILS architectures, will require extra effort, as, for each separate 
configuration, an evaluator, accreditor or other analyst must 
examine the rules for interactions between partitions. Frequent re-
evaluation of configuration data changes, or evaluation of 
configuration data in the field, may be problematic. 
8.2 Configuration Tools 
 Relative to EP architectures, which do not require configuration 
tools, the evaluation of MILS and LP configuration tools will 
require additional time and expense.  Additionally, standard 
methods for the assessment of configuration tools do not yet exist, 
so the evaluations will be more expensive, initially. 
8.3 Factoring and Reusability 
The PK offers a “policy neutral” reference validation mechanism, 
which can be reused in a conceivably broader range of systems 
than a security kernel.  The LP architecture also provides a policy-
neutral kernel, with the advantage of enforcing the MLS policy in 
the kernel.  However, inasmuch as the purpose of the MILS 
architecture is MLS policy enforcement, there seems to be little 
reusability advantage in moving the MLS policy enforcement 
function out of the kernel, as it is necessary to duplicate that 
functionality in every MILS system.    
8.4 Scalability  
PK-based architectures must provide a separate partition (or set of 
sub-partitions) for each supported MAC label upon initialization. 
Worse still, MILS systems, with single-process partitions, must 
initialize a partition for each application that may ever need to 
run.  Since scheduling and memory allocation are static, all 
applications are scheduled and fully occupy memory even when 
they are not being used.  This resulting pre-configuration of 
partitions would not be scalable to highly diverse security 
environments.[24]  In contrast, LP architectures with multiple 
applications per partition can dynamically schedule those 
applications within the partition’s time slice and memory domain. 
EP architectures are more dynamic still, creating new processes 
on the fly, and easily support a large number of different levels 
without requiring all applications and resources to be initialized at 
boot time. 
8.5 Performance 
We provide a few observations, but do not yet have in depth 
analysis. The overhead of a context switch is generally inversely 
proportional to the amount of context attributes to be managed.  
Thus, changing contexts within a process (i.e., between subjects 
or between a subject/process and the kernel) is faster than 
changing processes. The MILS services and program interactions 
are achieved through the use of separate processes.  For example, 
inter-partition communication involves switches between three 
partitions: the source, the AC-subject, and the destination; the 
result is that the AC-subject creates a star network among 
partitions. The EP and LP architectures use multiple subjects 
within a process, and perform access control via a subject/kernel 
interaction, which would generally be more efficient than the 
MILS task-switching approach, all other things being equal.   
To avoid covert timing channels, all MLS architectures must 
maintain a consistent allocation of time to each equivalence class, 
so interrupt-driven interactions with the MILS AC-subject would 
be constrained to be serviced within the MLS-aware scheduling 
sequence, which could adversely affect performance (of course 
some optimization is possible, via ordered scheduling, [17] etc.).  
On the other hand, MILS requires its PK to be “real time,” to 
some definition, which may help to mitigate this problem. 
9. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
Three MLS security architectures were analyzed: MILS, 
Evaluated Policy, and Least Privilege. The EP and LP approaches 
appear to have an overall advantage over MILs with respect to the 
factors addressed. However, it is likely that some of these factors 
would be more important than others, depending on the context in 
which a particular architecture might be applied, which could 
result in a different overall ranking.  Table 1 summarizes how the 
three architectures differ.  
Further research is needed to better quantify and create metrics for 
these architectural differences.[23] For example, we have no data 
at this point regarding how the architectures differ in their 
performance or prevention of covert channels.  
The flow-matrix model discussed in Section 3 might be shown to 
represent a noninterference property[15] if the “subject-resource” 
flow matrix were extended to include internal resources,[21] thus 
representing all state in the system.  We are working on analysis 
of the security properties of that extension. 
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 Table 1. Summary of MLS Security Architecture Differences 
 
Factors MILS Evaluated Policy Least Privilege 
Functional    
Specification of rules Configuration data Hard-coded in kernel Configuration data 
Locus of MLS enforcement  Kernel and trusted subject Kernel Kernel 
Relaxation of MLS policy Configuration data Assign subject a label range Configuration data 
Restrictions to MLS policy Sub-partitions  Rings Rings and subject-resource 
flow matrix 
Dynamic MLS policies Runtime Reconfiguration None Runtime Reconfiguration 
Assurance    
Persistence of MLS policy Dynamic with each boot Static once kernel is compiled Dynamic with each boot 
Design to avoid covert channels Static resource allocation leads 
to simpler design 
Dynamic resource allocation 
requires greater care in design 
Static resource allocation 
leads to simpler design 
Structural Abstractions Partition separation Process separation, rings and 
static policy 
Partition separation and rings  




Verification of configuration data Requires post-evaluation use of 
non-kernel tools 
Not needed Requires post-evaluation use 
of non-kernel tools 
Evaluatability & Usability     
TCB Code and Data Requires evaluation of kernel 
and AC-subject configuration 
data 
Does not require evaluation of 
configuration data 
Requires evaluation of kernel 
configuration data  
Configuration Tools Requires evaluation of kernel 
and AC-subject configuration 
tools 
Does not require evaluation of 
configuration tools 
Requires evaluation of kernel 
configuration tool 
Factoring and reusability Policy modifiable via 
reconfiguration (AC subject 
required) 
Single policy kernel Policy modifiable via 
reconfiguration 
Scaleable process support Statically defined by 
configuration 
Dynamic instantiation of 
processes 
Statically defined by 
configuration 
Scalable label spaces Label space proportional to 
total system resources 
Large label space possible Label space proportional to 
total system resources 
Performance Process context switches 
required for routing of data and 
services - slower 
Some services and data available 
through ring crossing – generally 
faster 
Some services and data 
available through ring 
crossing - generally faster 
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